The impact of large currency devaluations on output, as measured by the real gross domestic product, continues to be an elusive question in the empirical macroeconomic literature. This paper aims at reexamining and providing new empirical evidence on this relationship, by using a sample covering 109 emerging market and developing economies for the period 
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The recent global financial crisis has placed currencies across the world under severe pressure. The Mexican peso jumped from 9.9 pesos per US dollar in August 2008 to nearly 14.4 pesos per US dollar in February 2009. This is a 46 percent depreciation in a matter of six months. At about the same time, the Korean won jumped from just over a thousand wons per US dollar in July 2008 to over 1489 wons per US dollar in November 2008, a 48 percent depreciation rate. Such large exchange rate swings constitute recent examples of a phenomenon that has affected currency markets in the developed and developing world over the past fifty years.
When thinking about such episodes, it is unavoidable to ask how they affect economic growth. On the one hand, a real depreciation is expected to enhance price competitiveness and can stimulate domestic growth through the net trade contribution to real output. On the other hand, a sharp depreciation may imply higher inflation and a substantial terms-of-trade deterioration, which can weaken domestic demand and partly offset the positive effect of the depreciation on price competitiveness. Moreover, the disruption in the financial system that generally follow sharp currency depreciations (particularly in the presence of currency mismatch in the balance sheet of banks and other financial institutions) often add to the negative effect on output. On balance, therefore, it is difficult to predict whether depreciations are positively or negatively associated with output growth without a thorough analysis, especially that different effects may dominate at different horizons.
Given the importance of the link between exchange rate and growth, many papers have addressed specific aspects of the question. For instance, there is a vast literature on currency crises, which examines the factors and shocks triggering currency devaluations (e.g. Krugman (2000) , Agénor and Montiel (2008) or Tovar (2005)). Theory has also identified specific channels through which devaluations can affect output, e.g. the expenditure switching effect, export competitiveness or the balance sheet channels just to mention a few (see Agénor and Montiel (1999) , Krugman and Taylor (1979) , Burnstein et al (2007 and 2005) or Tovar (2005) ). An equally important strand of literature has aimed at examining how different depreciation episodes affect the dynamics of output (both in the short-and long-run) and what the main characteristics of an economy driving these dynamics are (e.g. Gupta et al (2007) , Edwards (1989) and Agénor and Montiel (1999) ).
Interestingly, in fact, the literature on the subject has considerably evolved in the past three decades, implying also a noticeable shift in the policy consensus over time. For instance, during the 1970s and 1980s, the exchange rate played a key policy role in stabilising and promoting output growth. Much of the emphasis in managing the exchange rate as a policy tool had to do with the fact that currency devaluations in the Mundell-Fleming theoretical framework are expansionary. The reason for this is that they induce an expenditure-switching effect towards domestically produced goods or increase the export competitiveness of the economy. However, the relevance of these positive effects has been challenged. Following the classical article by Krugman and Taylor (1979) , the notion that devaluations could have a detrimental impact on output gained acceptance. In their setting, differences in the marginal propensities to consume across agents in the economy adversely affect output. The literature that developed following the crises of the late 1990s shifted the emphasis on wealth effects as the key mechanism inducing a contractionary impact on output. In particular, in such 2 Unless otherwise stated, large losses in the value of a currency vis-à-vis the US dollar will be referred to as devaluations or depreciations, indistinctively.
framework devaluations weaken firm's balance sheets when their debts are denominated in foreign currency and their revenues in local currency (Krugman (1999) , Cespedes et al (2004) , Tovar (2005) ). Moreover, in such analysis the degree of real and financial openness of the economy, along with the degree of imperfections in capital markets and the level of indebtedness of the economy are key features determining the overall impact of devaluations.
Despite, an abundant literature on the topic, settling the ambiguity about the effects of large nominal currency devaluations on output continues to remain an open question. One indirect piece of evidence suggesting that the issue is not settled yet is that -looking back at the recent evidence-political and societal concerns could be heard both in countries that experienced appreciating pressures (e.g. the euro area, Japan or China) and in those that experienced depreciating pressures, such as the countries mentioned in the beginning of this introduction.
The aim of this paper is therefore to revisit the relation between large currency devaluations and GDP. Given the complexity of this issue, we take a specific angle here and focus on the following questions: first, what are the short-and long-run effects of large currency devaluations (depreciations) on output dynamics? And second, what characteristics of an economy determine an expansionary or contractionary impact? Unlike most existing literature, which has relied on small cross-section or short time series samples, our paper employs a unique dataset with a broad coverage across countries and time. More precisely, we rely on a panel for 108 emerging market economies (EMEs) for the period 1960-2006. Concerning the methodology, a particular feature of our analysis is that we emphasise two issues. On the one hand, we recognise that the short-and long-run impact of devaluations on output is likely to differ. 3 On the other hand, we take into account that the persistence of a devaluation episode may matter. That is, consecutive devaluations over time might have a different impact on output than devaluations that are just one-time events.
Importantly also, we subject our empirical analysis to a battery of robustness checks, related in particular to our definition of large devaluations. We explore different criteria and find that large currency devaluations are on average episodes in which a currency value declines by more than 20%. Surprisingly perhaps, such threshold value is quite robust across definitions, decades, regions and exchange rate regimes, as classified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) . Regarding this last aspect, it is worth stressing that we find large currency devaluations to be common phenomena across different exchange rate regimes. Therefore, the episodes that we examine are broader in nature to those studied in the currency crises literature, which tends to focus on episodes in which there is a shift from one exchange rate regime to another.
The rest of our analysis focuses on the dynamics of the output growth process around the time of large devaluations. With this in mind, we rely on a set of four complementary methodologies. 4 First, we examine the output dynamics through the lens of transition probabilities. This allows determining whether expansionary devaluations are more likely than contractionary ones, and whether initial business cycle conditions matter. Our results suggest that the likelihood of observing a positive growth rate in the year of a large 3 For example, the price elasticity of nominal trade flows is lower in the short-run than in the long-run (it actually switches signs for imports: import values first rise due to higher prices and subsequently decline as real imports fall). Hence, devaluations could deteriorate the trade balance in the short-run before improving in the long-run (J-curve effect). This would produce a lower growth in the short-run and higher in the long-run. 4 The literature on currency crises uses a variety of definitions. In addition to the nominal interest rate, such definitions may include international reserves and the interest rate. They may also consider different thresholds. Bussière and Fratzscher (2006) present a battery of tests along these lines and conclude that the empirical results are robust. devaluation is three times more likely than observing a contraction. They also suggest that observing positive growth rates in the years that follow these devaluationary episodes are the norm, independently of the initial conditions of the business cycle. Finally, our results indicate that the chance of experiencing an accelerating growth dynamics is greater if the economy was growing prior to a devaluation or if the episode is a one-time event devaluation (as opposed to repeated devaluations).
Second, we perform event case analyses. This allows us to consider the short-and mediumrun behaviour of output around the time of large devaluations. In doing so we split the episodes on the basis of the event being a stand alone incident or one that repeats itself over time. Our results confirm that the persistence of currency devaluations does matter. Onetime devaluations induce output and exchange rate dynamics that differ from consecutive devaluations. In addition, large currency devaluations tend to occur once the economy has experienced a slowdown.
Third, to complement the previous analyses a two-way fixed effects panel regression is employed. This framework allows examining the short-and medium-run behaviour of output around devaluationary episodes. This analysis is relevant to the extent that it provides a basis to compare the impact of such episodes vis-à-vis a control group (i.e. countries in which no large currency devaluations takes place). Estimates confirm that devaluations have a contemporaneous negative relation with output growth. Nonetheless, results do not support any ex-post economic benefit in the medium-run (i.e. two to three-year horizon). This is also consistent with the dynamics of the trade balance following a large devaluation: while we find that the trade balance tends to switch towards a surplus (or a lower deficit) after a devaluation, the adjustment seems to take place mostly through price changes and a fall in real imports, rather than a rise in real exports. This, in turn, suggests that three channels may be operating during the adjustment. The first one is the expenditure-switching effect, which can efficiently reduce imports. 5 The second one relates to the cost of imported inputs. In this case, higher import prices induce higher costs on imported inputs, thus adversely affecting domestic production and, possibly, exports, in particular, if higher import prices on inputs are passed-through to export prices. The third channel arises from export financing constraints, which may be binding, thus limiting the positive response of exports. This last aspect would underline the importance of avoiding a credit crunch after a large devaluation, given the detrimental effect on exports and, ultimately, on growth.
Finally, a dynamic VAR panel analysis is employed with the aim of assessing the impact of large devaluations on the level of output from the short to the long run. Impulse response analysis suggests that in the long-run (i.e. over a ten-year horizon) there is a significant output gain from one-time devaluation compared with no gains from consecutive devaluations.
The sensitivity of the results is further assessed in three dimensions. First, we examine the evidence under alternative "de facto" exchange rate regimes as classified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) . Contrary to common perception, large devaluations are equally likely in the full continuum of exchange rate regimes. Second, the sample is examined by sub-periods and, lastly, by regions. In general, we find that our full-sample results are sensitive to subsample breakdowns. Indeed, not only do we find significant differences across regions, but also evidence supporting a shift in the devaluation-output relationship over-time. For example, the significantly negative contemporaneous effect of currency devaluations on 5 We must emphasize that our sample of EMEs and developing countries, is one in which the exchange rate pass-through to import prices is substantial -compared, in particular, with the United States, where is known to be low. See Bussière and Peltonen (2008) for recent estimates of exchange rate pass-through across countries.
output in the full sample is associated with Asia and Latin America, while the impact for Africa and other countries is negligible. Similarly, the contemporaneous impact of currency devaluations is only significantly negative in the 1990s and 2000s. We only find evidence of a very significant positive impact on growth in the year following the devaluation during the 1960s. Such variation across countries and over time, of course, provides an explanation for the wide variety of results reported in the literature and do not support the notion of having a devaluation-output relationship that is stable over time (e.g. Gupta et al (2007) ).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature examining the link between devaluations and output. Section 3 defines large devaluation episodes, which we will also refer to as currency crises episodes, while Section 4 presents some stylised facts regarding such episodes, and present an analysis of output dynamics in countries exposed to large devaluation. Section 5 complements the analysis with panel regressions aimed at capturing the impact on output around the time of large devaluation and its impact on output trend, while taking into account a control group. Section 6 delves into the role of the external sector in explaining the relation between output growth and large devaluations. A final section concludes.
Review of the empirical literature
Preliminary considerations
Reviewing the empirical literature that examines the relationship between large currency devaluations and output is complicated for several reasons. First, the literature lacks a unified treatment for defining the relevant episodes under consideration. For instance, not all studies focus on large currency devaluations. Furthermore, defining what we mean by large devaluations involves a certain degree of arbitrariness. This is evident when we consider that in his classical paper, Cooper (1971) defined a large devaluation as any episode in which the annual exchange rate change exceeded 10%. Such a definition, in high inflation environments as those seen during the 1970s and 1980s, would have led to the identification of a currency crisis episode every single month (Frankel (2005) ). For this reason, more recent studies often employ alternative criteria; say, by including not just the change in the exchange rate, but also the acceleration in the devaluation rate and its initial level. Equally important is that studies differ on whether the explanatory variable is the nominal or the real exchange rate change. Certainly, not all nominal devaluations translate into real ones. However, empirical evidence does support that nominal devaluations, more often than not, lead to real devaluations (Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza (2002) for developing countries).
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The task of comparing large currency devaluations with currency crises episodes is further complicated when the event is identified not just by the magnitude of the exchange rate change, but also by changes in other variables, as captured by exchange rate market pressure (EMP) indices. In fact, identifying crises episodes based on commonly applied EMP indices is highly sensitive to the choice of weighting schemes and the parametric assumptions used in the construction of thresholds (Potines and Siregar (2008) ). As a result, different weighting schemes leads to differences in identified crisis episodes.
Second, the literature has also failed to treat the impact on output in a uniform manner. While many studies directly employ real GDP growth rates in a given year (or quarter), others 6 This lends support to Goldfajn and Valdes' (1999) statement that in the last 35 years policy makers in most countries have preferred to correct large real appreciations through nominal devaluations.
define the impact of devaluations on output by comparing the difference between the average output growth some period after the crisis (eg the year of the crisis and the year after it) and some "tranquil" period prior to it. Aside from the arbitrariness of such an approach, the problem is that it neglects the importance of considering the dynamics of the process, including the importance of taking into account the persistence of the shock. Moreover, by doing so, many studies fail to establish a difference among the short-, mediumand long-run output effects of devaluations.
Third, existing studies tend to be quite susceptible to selection bias, either due to a small sample of countries, a short sample period or the use of cross-sectional data (which precludes the use of a control group). As a result, a wide variety of statistical and econometric methods have been employed, setting additional hurdles to the comparison of results.
Expansionary or contractionary devaluations?
In general, a significant number of studies for EMEs support the contractionary impact of currency devaluations or currency crises on output. Classical studies such as those by Edwards (1989 Edwards ( , 1987 Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) find that output during the year of the crisis is lower than the average during the three-year period preceding and following the crisis. 7 They also find that the strongest predictor of output growth after a crisis is the average growth rate behaviour before the crisis. That is, there appears to be a "continuity" effect on output behaviour, which points out to a potential selection bias problem associated with the fact that countries devalue after entering a recession. However, such results differ from those reported by Gupta et al (2007) , who find that contractionary episodes occur at the peak of an economic boom. In this respect, they also report that that these contractionary effects are exacerbated if trade competitors devalue their currencies, oil prices rise or tight monetary policies are implemented following a crisis. These results are in line with Hutchison and Noy (2002) who find that contractionary effects are associated with real exchange rate overvaluation, slow growth of trading partners and substantial losses in international reserves.
The contractionary effects of devaluations have been qualified by explicitly testing the importance of some transmission channels, such as the balance sheet effect or the impact of financial dollarisation. Cavallo, et al (2002) find that devaluations in the presence of large foreign currency liabilities can increase the value of debt relative to revenues, crippling insufficiently hedged debtors and leading to business failures and output contractions. Bebczuk et al (2007) find that devaluations are contractionary once dollarisation is controlled for. However, Cespedes (2005) finds contractionary balance sheet effects from real exchange rate devaluations only in the short-run; they have expansionary effects in the medium term.
The importance of alternative features of exchange rate behaviour has also been explored. For example, Chou and Chao (2001) find that devaluation has no effect on output for five 7 They identify crises by different measures that involve the level, acceleration and past levels of devaluation rates.
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Asian countries but exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on output growth in the short-run.
Recent evidence suggests that the contractionary relationship between devaluations and output is not as robust as suggested in the literature surveyed so far. 8 As mentioned in the introduction, Gupta et al (2007) have reported split evidence in terms of the devaluationoutput relationship, showing that in a cross-section of 195 crises episodes in 91 developing countries from 1970-2000 contractionary and expansionary effects of currency crises tend to occur with the same frequency. 9 One reason for such ambiguous results in the literature is a lack of a control group (ie a selection-bias problem). Using a data set of 155 countries for the period 1970-1999 with 264 devaluation episodes, Magendzo (2002) finds that the contractionary effect of devaluations vanishes once selection bias is taken care of. In fact, using alternative definitions of devaluations and matching estimators to generate a control group, he concludes that " [t] he results are robust: devaluations show no statistically significant effect on output growth".
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The literature is also inconclusive regarding the stability of the relationship over time or across regions. In this respect, it would be reasonable to expect changes in the devaluationoutput relationship, given that some key factors involved in the transmission channel may have changed in the recent years (eg the exchange rate pass-through), while the relevance of others may have surfaced (eg the balance sheet effect) or faded over time. This is evident in financially more open economies where firms easily get exposed to currency mismatches, thus becoming vulnerable to currency devaluations in a manner that was not possible in the previous decades. The impact of devaluations on output may have also changed with financial deepening or as some countries de-dollarise their economies, as emphasized by Cespedes (2005) and Bebczuk et al (2007) . Not surprisingly, Kim and Ying (2007) find evidence of contractionary devaluations in Asia after 1998 but expansionary for the pre-1997 period. Nonetheless, they find a persistent contractionary relationship for Chile and Mexico. For this reason, it is surprising that Gupta et al (2007) report that the split expansionary/contractionary pattern found is consistent across the three decades covered in their study.
Interestingly, the lack of robustness of results in the literature is not exclusive to EMEs: the split expansionary and contractionary impact is also observed in developed economies. Focusing on 23 OECD countries, Kalyoncu et al (2008) find that real depreciations are contractionary in the long-run in six countries and expansionary in three; and fail to find evidence of a long-run effect on output in the remaining countries. In contrast, Ahmed et al (2002) compare devaluation episodes across a group of developing and industrial economies, where industrial economies are split according to their exchange rate regime.
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They find that for industrial countries both devaluations and depreciations are expansionary, while for developing countries devaluations are contractionary.
Overall, the split evidence in the literature has reinforced the idea that structural models may be more informative in answering the devaluation-output relationship. For instance, Tovar (2006 and 2005) estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to assess the relative importance of different transmission channels through which currency devaluations may affect output. Considering a model with expansionary expenditure-switching and contractionary balance sheet effects built-in, he concludes that policy induced devaluations in Chile, Colombia, Korea and Mexico have been expansionary, despite the contractionary balance sheet effect -a result consistent with the dominance of the expenditure-switching over the balance sheet effect. Burstein et al (2007 and 2005) have also looked into the impact of large exchange rate devaluations. Although their interest is in the exchange rate pass-through on the real exchange rate, they do highlight that devaluations are often associated with negative wealth effects. In practice, this implies that to capture the contraction in economic activity, it is necessary to consider parallel adverse shocks, such a decline in export demand or one that captures a decline in real wealth, such as a decline in net foreign assets.
Defining large currency devaluation episodes
Defining a large currency devaluation episode is a matter of much controversy as it involves a high degree of subjectivity. This is also an inherent problem of the currency crises literature, which has relied on different definitions. In defining these episodes, a common approach is to construct a weighted index based on exchange rate changes, the loss of international reserves and changes in interest rates. Although desirable, this approach is not pursued here, partly because our main interest is related to the real effects of large currency fluctuations on output, and also because the lack of data for different countries (at a quarterly or monthly frequency for a long time span on interest rates) would severely restrict the sample size of the analysis. 12 By contrast, the data on exchange rate is widely available across countries and over time.
In what follows, four alternative definitions based on nominal exchange rate fluctuations are considered. This aims at providing transparent and robust results. The first two definitions follow Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) ; the third and fourth are introduced to reduce some of the subjectivity in defining large exchange rate devaluations. Definition 1: A large currency devaluation episode occurs if the nominal exchange rate change in a given year,
Definitions of large devaluations: General
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, satisfies the following three criteria: a. The exchange rate devaluation is at least 25 percent:
The exchange rate change at least doubles that of the previous year. Formally,
c. The exchange rate change during the previous year does not exceed 40 percent.
More precisely,
Definition 2:
A large currency devaluation episode occurs if the nominal exchange rate change in a given year, t S ∆ , satisfies the following three criteria: a. The exchange rate change exceeds 15 percent:
b. The exchange rate change exceeds by at least 10 percent that of the previous year. Formally,
c. The exchange rate change in the previous year must not exceed 10 percent.
A key difference between definitions 1 and 2 is that the first one captures large exchange rate changes episodes while avoiding, for instance, capturing large exchange rate fluctuations associated with high-inflation episodes. On the contrary, the second definition focuses on episodes in which the exchange rate was relatively stable during the previous year.
Definition 3: A large devaluation episode occurs if the change in the exchange rate is in the top quartile of all the devaluationary episodes in the sample. Notice that to implement this definition we exclude appreciation episodes.
Definition 4:
The aim here is to consider extreme episodes, which will be referred to as hyper-devaluations. These episodes are defined as those in which the exchange rate change is in the top quartile of the top quartile of all devaluationary episodes (ie, top 6.25%). In other words, hyper-devaluation episodes are those that are in the top quartile of the episodes identified by definition 3.
Definitions of a large devaluation: Event case specific
Given that the paper aims at capturing the dynamics of output around the time of a large devaluation, we define a series of experiments or events in which the dynamics of output around the time of one or two consecutive large devaluations are examined.
Event case 1: describes the average dynamics of output when a large currency devaluation occurs in a given year (T) and no devaluation takes place within a three-year window before (T-3, T-2, T-1) and after the event (T+1, T+2, T+3).
Event case 2: describes the dynamics of output when a large devaluation occurs consecutively in two years (T-1 and T) and no devaluation occurs around a three-year window before (T-4, T-3, T-2) and after (T+1, T+2, T+3).
Alternative specifications of devaluations were also considered. 14 However, the number of episodes fell considerably (less than ten in each case) making their analysis and any inference not representative.
The manner in which we have defined each event case allows us to capture explicitly the role of devaluation persistence over time. In this respect, event case 1 is not contaminated by other devaluationary episodes, thus describing an episode with no persistence. In contrast, event case 2 would explicitly incorporate into the analysis the role of the persistence of devaluations.
Stylised facts
This section presents key stylised facts about large currency devaluations and output dynamics. Starting with the former, the criteria for identifying large devaluations discussed in the previous section are implemented using data for 108 countries from 1960-2006 (see appendices A and B for data sources and a list of countries included in the study).
Frequency and threshold values of large currency devaluations
The threshold values determining a large currency devaluation episode and the number of episodes identified under the four alternative definitions are reported in the top panel of Table  1 for the full sample, by decades, by regions and exchange rate regimes as classified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) . Full sample statistics show that definition 3 identifies by far the largest number of episodes, 609 in total. This definition is much less restrictive than the alternative definitions 1 and 2, which capture fewer episodes (216 and 282, respectively).
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Interestingly, these three definitions identify threshold values of similar magnitude and comparable with those found in the literature. That is, a large devaluation occurs on average when the nominal exchange rate devalues by more than 20 percent in a given year. Finally, hyper-devaluations, as captured by definition 4, occur when the value lost by a currency in a given year exceeds 93 percent.
Summary statistics also indicate that large devaluations occurred with greater frequency during the 1980s and 1990s. According to Table 1 , large devaluations were more frequent during these decades nearly by a ratio of four under definitions 1 or 3, or by a ratio of two if definition 2 is employed. Hyper-devaluations are also found to be nearly 8 times more frequent during the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s or 2000s.
Large devaluations are also found to happen more frequently in Africa, followed by Latin America. Although the number episodes vary significantly depending on the definition employed, the percentage of episodes occurring in each region is fairly stable, independently of the definition employed. In particular about two-fifths of total episodes occur in Africa and about a third in Latin America.
Finally, we also examine whether large currency devaluations are episodes that are related exclusively by a type of exchange rate regime. In particular, this allow us to address a concern in which most people would associated these episodes with a currency crises driven by the break of a peg or some form of soft pegs. The evidence reported in the bottom part of Table 1 shows that large currency devaluations tend to occur with a high frequency across all exchange rate regimes. Nonetheless is particularly notorious in what Reinhart and Rogoff classify as "free falling regimes", which are those in which the twelve-month inflation equals or exceeds 40 percent or those in which there is a currency crises as defined by a transition from a fixed or quasi-fixed regime to a managed or independently floating regime. The evidence also shows that devaluations also occur in flexible exchange rate regimes. Notice also that the threshold value for inclusion as a large currency devaluation is fairly stable across exchange rate regimes, although there is a it tends to be relatively higher under the "freely falling" regime.
Overall, it is worth highlighting that the threshold value for each definition of a large devaluation is surprisingly stable across definitions, both over time, regions and, to a lesser extent across exchange rate regimes. For these reasons, and with the purpose of simplifying the exposition of our results, we put more weight on the use of definition 3. This definition relies less on ad-hoc restrictive features. This is well illustrated, for instance, by the fact that definition 1 would fail to capture an episode at time T, in which the devaluation rates at T-1 and T were, say, 30% and 58%, respectively. Table 2 uses definition 3 to select the episodes to be included in events cases 1 and 2. As shown, just over 11% of the 609 episodes identified by definition 3 can be considered onetime events in a three-year window before and after the event, and just over 6% would be consecutive devaluations. This highlights that in most episodes the dynamics of devaluations on output is easily contaminated by neighbouring devaluations in time or by other factors eg hype-inflationary episodes. The table confirms that large devaluationary episodes occur when the exchange rate changes by a magnitude that is very close to 20%: a result that appears to be quite robust when considering the regional or exchange rate regime breakdown. However, a breakdown by sub-periods shows that the threshold value for onetime devaluations has a sustained an upward trend since the 1970s. This implies that to be considered a large devaluation the exchange rate had to devalue by at least 20% in the 1970s and by at least 26% in the 2000s. The pattern is somewhat less stable when two consecutive devaluations occur, however, it seems one can comfortably conclude that a large devaluationary episode occurs when the annual currency devalues by more than 20% in a year.
Output dynamics in crisis countries
Transition probabilities
To get a preliminary assessment of the output dynamics of output following a devaluation we calculate the frequency of expansionary or contractionary episodes that follow a devaluationary episode, together with its median growth rate. In addition, we calculate some conditional probabilities of certain types events taking place after a devaluation and conditional on initial output conditions. The types of events that we examine include expansionary or contractionary episodes in the years that follow a devaluation or accelerating or decelerating growth episodes. This analysis allows us to answer some specific questions: i) how likely is it for a country to have an output expansion in T+1 or in subsequent years given that the economy had a devaluation at T and output growth in T was negative?. Or ii) how likely is it for an economy to experience accelerating (
) growth rates once a devaluation took place. Iii) Finally, how do the initial business cycle conditions (eg expansion or contraction) influence output dynamics after a large devaluationary episode. Table 3 reports the frequency and the median growth rate of output conditional on having a devaluation and either a positive or negative growth rate in year T. In addition we report the conditional probabilities of different events. For possible conditional events are considered: 1) A positive or negative growth the year after a devaluation; 2) Positive or negative growth rates during the two years that follow a devaluation; 3) Accelerating or decelerating growth dynamics during the two years after the devaluation. Our calculations show that the likelihood of observing a positive growth the same year of a devaluation is greater than observing a recession (0.72 versus 0.28). Also there appears to be a symmetry between the median growth rate of an expansion and a contraction (4 percent in absolute value in both cases). Regarding the conditional growth dynamics we find that the likelihood of experiencing a positive growth in T+1 is greater, than observing a contraction independently of whether the economy grew at T or not (0.80 or 0.63 vs 0.36). Also that economies with positive growth rates in T have a higher probability of remaining in a positive growth path in a one or two year horizon than those that had a recession in T (0.77 vs 0.13 or 0.53). Our calculations also suggest that it is quite unlikely to remain in a recession or to go into a recessionary growth dynamics in the two years that follow a devaluation. Table 4 modifies the previous analysis by examining the possibility of experiencing accelerating or decelerating growth episodes once a devaluation takes place in T the position of the business cycle prior to the devaluation is controlled for. In particular, we condition either by the output growth the year prior to the devaluation (
) or by the three year average growth rate prior to the devaluation taking place ( ( ) 3
). The calculations show that an economy is quite likely to experience an expansion in the short and medium run if the economy was growing prior to the devaluation. By contrast, an economy has just over fifty percent chance of growing at T if the economy devalued following a recession. In such cases, the median growth rate at T is lower than the median growth rates observed in economies that were already expanding prior to the devaluation. In addition, we also find that an economy is more likely to observe accelerating growth dynamics if the devaluation takes place during an expansion. Tables 5 and 6 report a similar calculation but restricting the devaluationary episode to a one-time (Event Case 1) or to a two-year consecutive event (Event Case 2), respectively. Evidence in Table 5 confirms that accelerating episodes are more likely if the devaluation took place after an expansionary period rather than during a recession. We also find that the probability of observing accelerating growth after three years is much higher (although unlikely) for one-time devaluations episodes than for cases in which devaluations can randomly repeat themselves over time or when two-consecutive devaluations take place (0.21 vs 0.13 and 0.21 vs 0.05, respectively, if we only take into account the year prior to the devaluation). In fact, Table 6 shows that accelerating episodes following consecutive devaluations are unlikely to occur, even if the devaluation took place during an expansion.
Overall, our analysis of transition probabilities suggests that expansionary episodes at the time of a devaluation are three times more likely to occur than contractionary ones; that the economy is more likely to witness sustained growth if the economy devalue following an expansionary cycle; and, finally, that accelerating episodes are more likely to occur if the devaluation is a one-time event.
Event case analysis
Turning now to the dynamics of output around the time of a currency devaluation (as described in both event cases), the average time series is reported in Figure 1 (middle panels). To provide a better characterization of each event, the scatter plot of output growth and the exchange rate change at the time of a devaluation is displayed (left-hand panel) along with the dynamics of the exchange rate change (right-hand panel). Finally, the 25 and 75 percentiles of the distribution are also displayed.
The output growth dynamics for event case 1 follows an s-type pattern (Figure 1 , uppermiddle panel): on average growth slows down prior to the devaluation, moderately picks up at the time of the devaluation and accelerates afterwards. This seems to confirm the "continuity effect" of currency crises on output identified by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) . Notice also that growth rates a year to three years after the episode are on average higher than before the event. We also find that the currency falls in value by an order of 60% on average (upper right-hand panel), with devaluation rates being quite low immediately before and after the episode.
Output dynamics around the time of two consecutive large devaluations, ie event case 2, follows no well defined pattern (Figure 1, bottom-center panel) . Prior to the devaluations, output growth is low (less than 1%), picks up notoriously at the time of the first devaluation, remains steady at the time of the second one, and then gradually increases. The exchange rate dynamics shows a well-defined pattern (Figure 1 , bottom-right panel) i) the first devaluation (occurring at T-1) is on average larger than the second one (occurring at T); ii) following the two large devaluations, the exchange rate change stays at a level that is on average slightly higher than the one before the event took place; and, finally, iii) on average, the magnitude of the first devaluation in the event case 2 is smaller than that occurring in one-time devaluationary episodes, ie, during the event case 1 (42% vs 60%).
Taking these events together, it is possible to conclude the following about the growth dynamics before, during and after a devaluation. First, results show that there is a slowdown (either gradually as in event case 1 or sharply as in event case 2) before the event occurs. Second, at the time of the episode, the impact on output differs depending on the persistence of the devaluation. Finally, following the event, growth increases. In other words, in the medium-term devaluations are on average expansionary. Notice that since there is no control group, we cannot say anything of how the growth rate compares between countries experiencing a currency devaluation and those that do not. This is an issue we tackle with econometrics in the next section.
Are such patterns robust across time and regions? Figures 2 and 3 report the dynamics for each event case by decade, while Figures 4 and 5 display it by region. According to them, the pattern of output growth around a devaluationary event is not robust over time or across regions.
16 Nonetheless some features might explain this. The first has to do with the magnitude of devaluations over time. While on average, one-time events (Figure 2 , righthand panels) became larger during the 1990s and 2000s (exceeding in both cases 60% versus an average of about 40% seen during previous decades), the magnitude of the first devaluation in the case of consecutive events is more uniform (around 40%, Figure 3 , righthand panel). Second, there are also notorious differences in the magnitude of devaluations across regions. On the one hand, one-time devaluations have been much larger in Africa (on average around 65%) and smaller in Asia (on average about 40%). On the other hand, the magnitude of consecutive events varies considerably across regions. For example, consecutive devaluations are smaller in magnitude in Africa than in Latin America.
<<Regression by exchange rate regimes to be included here>> Overall, we find no robust behaviour of output growth around the time of a currency devaluation. This contrasts with Gupta et al (2007) , who find a robust pattern over time. Several factors may explain this divergence of results. On the one hand, they identify currency crises on the basis of episodes identified by a number of different studies, to which they apply a majority rule. Although they claim that applying such rule windows out crises too close to each other, it appears that this might not be the case. Second, Gupta et al (2007) treat all devaluationary episodes equally, independently of their persistence. Here, we have shown that one-time devaluations induce a dynamics that differs from that associated with consecutive ones.
Econometric evidence
In this section, we present different econometric methodologies aimed at establishing whether there is a robust pattern of output growth behaviour around the time of a large currency devaluation. Two sets of econometric methodologies are employed. The first, motivated by Forbes (2002) , uses a panel regression to evaluate the output growth behaviour around the time of a crisis, which allows us to compare the dynamics of output in countries affected by a devaluation with those that are not. The second, motivated by Cerra and Saxena (2008), uses a dynamic panel approach to establish the impact of devaluations on output trend. The permanent impact on output is therefore evaluated with an impulse response to a devaluationary shock. The exercises aim at providing complementary information, however they are not fully comparable as one is a static panel regression, while the second is a fully dynamic panel regression.
Impact of devaluations on output growth: a static econometric analysis
This section examines the impact of devaluations on output growth rates using two-way fixed effects panel regressions. The equation is given by: ε is the two-way composite error that includes an unobserved effect, an idiosyncratic time-constant factor and a time-varying but cross-section constant factor. Notice that the full sample of countries is necessary to compare the performance of countries devaluing versus countries that do not devalue. In this sense, this exercise extends the analysis reported in the previous section. Table 2 reports the estimates of equation 1 for the four definitions of a large devaluation described in Section 3.1. Several results stand out. First, countries experiencing a large devaluation witness output growth rates that are on average between 1.2 and 1.9 percentage points lower the year prior to the episode. Second, countries experiencing a large currency devaluation display on average lower growth rates in the year of devaluation. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant, and their magnitudes suggest an output growth rate that is on average between 0.8 and 2.1 percentage points below those countries that do not devalue. Third, output growth rates in countries that devalue vis-à-vis those that do not are not statistically different two or three years prior to a devaluationary episodes or after the episode takes place. Finally, it is worth highlighting that inflation appears to be a statistically significant control.
So far, we have not considered well defined events as we did in the previous section. In other words, we have not controlled for the fact that in some cases consecutive devaluations might have taken place. This, of course, can distort the results. Therefore, Table 3 reports the same set of regressions but this time the large devaluation episode is captured by the dummies for event cases 1 and 2. A robust result emerges: countries devalue after entering a sharp recession. Indeed, the regressions using the event case 1 dummy indicates growth rates that are within 2.5 and 2.8 percentage points below the control group in the two years before the devaluation episode. When using the event case 2 dummy, output growth is 3.8 percentage points below the year before the first devaluation. These results are consistent with Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) . In addition, regressions for event case 1 show that output growth is statistically and significantly lower by two percentage points during the year of the devaluation in countries that devalue vis-à-vis those that do not. However, regressions including the event case 2 dummy show no contemporaneous impact of devaluations. Finally, devaluations are found to have no statistically significant impact on output growth after the devaluation. Overall, these results reveal that the contemporaneous devaluationoutput relationship does change depending on the persistence of the devaluation.
How robust are these results over time and across regions? Tables 4 and 5 report the same regressions by decade; but only for definition 3 and event cases 1 and 2. The evidence suggests that the relationship between devaluations and output has changed over time. Under definition 3 (Table 4) , we find that devaluations were expansionary in the short-run (the year following a devaluation) during the 1960s and countries devalued after entering recessions in the 1990s and 2000s. Devaluations are also found to have a significantly negative contemporaneous effect during the 2000s. In the medium-term (2 or 3 years after the devaluation), devaluations were expansionary in the 1970s and 1980s, and contractionary in the 2000s.
In contrast, regressions from one time devaluations (event case 1, Table 5) suggest that countries devalued after a boom in the 1960s, but after a recession in the 1980s and 1990s. Only during the 1990s is the contemporaneous impact of a one-time devaluation (ie event case 1) found to be significantly negative. Devaluations were expansionary in the short-run only in the 1960s. In the medium run, there were output gains in the 1970s and losses in the 2000s. Under event case 2, countries devalue after a deep recession in the 1960s, have significantly lower growth in the year of the first devaluation during the 1960s and 2000s, but have a significantly higher growth rate in the year after the first devaluation in the 1960s. There are output gains in the 1980s and 1990s and loss in the 2000s in the medium-run. Overall, it appears that during the 1960s devaluations had positive impacts on growth (contemporaneously or ex-post) and negative impact in the medium run in the 2000s. During the other decades, either medium-rum impact is insignificant or positive depending on the definition used. In general, this supports the notion that the devaluation-output relationship has changed over time, which indirectly implies that the relevant transmission channels have also changed.
Tables 6 and 7 report the same type of regressions as above by regions. Using definition 3 (Table 6 ), we find devaluations to have no discernible effect in Africa and the Other region. In contrast, Asia and Latin America devalue after recessions (-1.6% and -0.8%, respectively) and experience a contemporaneous output loss of more than two percentage points. Finally, in the medium-term, there are growth gains in Latin America (+1.2 %) and a loss in Asia (-1.1 %).
Under a one-time devaluation (event case 1, Table 7 , left side) we find a significant slowdown in Latin America up to three years before the crisis, and an average contemporaneous negative growth effect of about 4 percentage points. When consecutive devaluations are considered (event case 2), we find a significantly negative growth rate before the first devaluation in Asia. There is a significant negative impact of the first devaluationary episode in both Asia and Latin America, and the impact persists for Latin America at the time of the second devaluation. However, there is evidence of some medium term gains in Latin America and the Other region, but losses persist in Asia (Table 7 , right side).
The impact of devaluations on output levels: A dynamic panel analysis
So far we have examined the output dynamics around the time of a large currency devaluation. In those analyses we did not examine the causality of the relationship. In this section we follow Cerra and Saxena (2008) to identify the impact of devaluationary shocks on the level of output. For this purpose, we estimate a univariate autoregressive model in output growth rates using panel data with fixed effects and report the group averages of impulse responses of output to the shock. Such a specification accounts for the non-stationarity of output and for serial correlation in growth rates. 17 As in the previous sections, shocks are also analysed over time and regions. The specific model estimated is given by: Following Cerra and Saxena (2008) discussion on exogeneity of crises on growth, we estimate this specification so that large devaluations only have a lagged effect on output.
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The impulse responses of a devaluationary shock on output for the full sample are reported in Figure 6 , for each of the definitions (see Section 3.1) and for each event case (see Section 3.2). The impulse responses under definitions 2 to 4 and under event case 2 show no statistically significant impact on output in the long-run. Contrasting with this evidence, the impulse response results for definition 1 and event case 1 show a significant long run positive impact on output trend -the long-run impact from one time devaluation (3.77%) is about three times the size of the impact from those identified by definition 1 (1.27%). These results stress again the importance of devaluation persistence, as the results seem to imply that stand alone devaluations may have a much greater positive long-run impact on growth. Overall, the evidence for our full sample indicates that one-time devaluations can offer permanent output growth gains in the long run.
6
Understanding the role of the external sector
Previous sections explored the link between exchange rates and growth from an aggregate perspective (i.e. focusing on results from panel data estimations), finding that such relationship is heterogeneous across regions and time periods. Now we delve into a different dimension of the panel analysis. More precisely, we now aim at answering what accounts for the differences in the dynamics of real output across large devaluation episodes. In particular, it seems relevant to ask whether it matters for output growth the manner in which the economy adjusts after a large devaluation.
A key aspect to consider is the role of the external sector and the manner in which it adjusts following large currency devaluations. In some episodes, large exchange rate devaluations are accompanied by an adjustment of the trade balance, while in others no adjustment takes place. To understand better the implications of a possible correction of any external imbalance at the time of large currency devaluations, let us consider first from a theoretical perspective the expected effects of a currency devaluation on trade, and then examine the empirical evidence.
Some theoretical considerations
In theory, a nominal currency depreciation is expected to have opposing effects on exports and imports. On the export side, it enhances the price competitiveness of exports in foreign markets, which leads to a rise in real exports. However, this effect often operates with a lag (quantities cannot adjust immediately to a positive demand stimulus from foreign countries, especially if there are fixed costs in production). 20 Another effect may also operate, namely a rise in export prices in domestic currency terms, as exporters increase their profit margins (exporters partly "price-to-market"). The combine impact of these effects (on prices and on real quantities) raises the value of exports in the currency of the country that devalues.
On the import side, a currency devaluation has two opposing effects. On the one hand, it raises the value of imports in domestic currency terms (unless there is full incomplete exchange rate pass-through, a case that is not empirically relevant for the vast majority of countries). 21 On the other hand, the rise in relative import prices triggers an expenditure switching effect away from foreign goods and towards domestically produced goods. These two effects (upwards on prices and downwards on quantities) may cancel out. Nonetheless, in the short run, the price effect generally dominates, triggering a temporary deterioration of the trade balance, before the effect on quantities takes place -an adjustment known in the literature as the J-curve.
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The adjustment described above also explains the expected relation between exchange rates, growth and inflation. In particular, it is worth emphasising that the stimulating impact on export price competitiveness (and on domestic demand for locally produced goods) is expected to foster growth, whereas higher import prices (and upward pressures on export prices and profit margins in the export sector) are expected to induce higher domestic costs, and therefore higher inflation. In fact, a rise in domestic inflation may partly offset any price competitiveness gains arising from the nominal depreciation (by raising costs). Also rising inflation can adversely affect domestic demand and output. For these reasons, the overall effect of devaluations on output is contingent on whether a depreciation occurs along with rising inflation or not.
A caveat is that the mechanism described so far tends to work under very particular conditions. For example, they typically apply to countries pegging their exchange rate at an unsustainable rate and were price rigidities play a significant role, thus eroding the favourable price competitiveness of their exports. Nonetheless, omitted considerations related to the role of the financial sector and to the level and structure of foreign debt may alter the outcome. For instance, it is often the case that countries experiencing a sharp depreciation also require other adjustments, eg in the banking of financial sector, a phenomenon commonly referred to as "twin crisis": In such case, banking sectors are going through serious stress, leading to bank runs, a dry out of credit lines ie a credit crunch, and massive capital outflows. Under such circumstances the exchange rate adjustment is just a consequence. Of course, the credit crunch and domestic financial meltdown that accompany the currency crisis can adversely affect the real economy and the exporting sector (as export financing dries up). Equally relevant, although idiosyncratic to EMEs, is the extent of the currency composition of external debt. Historical constrains which forced countries to borrow in foreign currency (what is commonly referred to as the "origin sin" 23 ), set the stage for unexpected depreciations to increase the value of external debt in domestic currency and worsen firms balance sheets when firm's revenues were denominated in local currency. Thus, inducing in some cases defaults, and in others severe credit crunches (and ultimately lower exports).
Overall, different mechanisms are likely to affect the relation between exchange rates, inflation, output growth, exports and imports. Our goal is to improve our understanding of the link between these variables by analysing the experience of the countries that went through a marked depreciation.
Devaluations and the trade balance
The effect of large depreciations on the trade balance can be examined in an aggregate manner by pooling all countries together and assuming slope homogeneity (i.e. a similar marginal effect of our depreciation dummy on the trade balance). The trade balance is defined as the ratio of exports minus imports to total exports. This differs from the more usual definition of exports minus imports to GDP. Choosing such definition avoids a simultaneity problem. Indeed, as discussed in previous section, output growth reacts to a sharp depreciation (on average, it falls significantly), therefore the ratio of net exports to GDP could in theory vary even if exports and imports were to stay constant.
The results are presented in Table 8 . Similarly to those for output, the estimates vary somewhat according to which definition is used for the devaluation dummy. In the case of the trade balance, results using definition 1-3 show that the coefficient of the contemporaneous dummy variable is not significantly different from zero, whereas the coefficient using definition 4 (a hyper-devaluation) is significant and positive. This suggests that, if anything, only very large devaluations are associated with a switch towards a higher surplus.
The breakdown of the trade balance into its two components (exports and imports) shed further light into this issue. The two columns on the right hand side of Table 8 report similar estimation results, where the dependent variable are the growth rates (year-on-year) of export and import values. The results show where the improvement of the trade balance comes from: in three out of four cases, the value of exports (in national currency terms) rises during the crisis, whereas the value of imports does not change significantly (except when using definition 4, in which case it rises). The fact that export values increase may come, both, from higher export prices (if exporters price-to-market, taking advantage of the gain in competitiveness to increase profit margins) or export volumes. The two effects (on prices and on volumes) therefore play in the same direction and contribute to a rise in export values. In the case of imports, the expected effects of the devaluation on real flows and on prices play in the opposite direction: the devaluation is anticipated to increase import prices ("exchange rate pass-through") but decrease import volumes ("expenditure switching effect"); the two effects appear here to cancel each other.
The breakdown of trade flows into prices and volumes would really help understand the adjustment mechanism further. Unfortunately, such breakdown is unavailable for most countries in the sample. Nonetheless, a few examples may be helpful. The first is that of Argentina, whose currency depreciated sharply in 2002, to 3.3 pesos per dollar (from parity 23 See Eichengreen et al. (2003) .
level a year before). On a year-to-year basis, the value of Argentinean exports remained broadly constant in 2002 at around USD 26 billion (bn), whereas the value of Argentinean imports fell markedly, from USD 20 bn to USD 9 bn (still representing a rise by 50% in peso terms). Volume indices for Argentina's exports and imports provided by the IMF (IFS line 72 and 73) indicate that the volume of exports remained broadly unchanged in 2002, whereas the volume of imports fell sharply, by over 50%. This example illustrates that the adjustment in real terms is entirely associated with lower import volumes and not from higher real exports. Argentina exported in 2002 the same quantity of goods as in 2001, corresponding to the same dollar value; only, they were paid a higher value for these goods in peso terms. Conversely, on the import side, they had to pay a much higher price (in peso terms), which triggered a pronounced fall in the volume of imported goods (the fall in domestic demand associated with the crisis may likely reinforced this effect). In fact, higher export prices (in pesos) can partly be considered as a counterpart of the higher import prices if part of the inputs for exported goods are imported (inflation reached nearly 26% in 2002).
A second interesting example is that of South Korea, which experienced in 1997 a sharp depreciation against the dollar (to 1484 won, from 839 won one year before). Similarly to Argentina, the value of Korean trade exports in US dollar terms did not rise significantly in 1997 nor in 1998. However, the value of Korean imports fell significantly in 1998. Similarly again, the fall in the value of imports was largely due to a fall in import volumes (a fall by over 22% in 1998), on the backdrop of rising import prices and a fall in domestic demand. However, one important difference is that export volumes did rise after the crisis (by 25% in 1997 and 7% in 1998) and that inflation remained well below 10% during the entire episode.
Conclusions
This paper presents new empirical evidence to the literature that has grappled with the question of how large currency devaluations affect output. The relevance of answering this question has to do with two main issues: First, due to the theoretical ambiguity with various transmission mechanisms working in opposite directions, settling this question is largely an empirical exercise; and, second, existing empirical evidence so far has failed to provide conclusive evidence regarding the direction of this relationship.
The evidence that we have reported has employed the largest data set assembled so far to study the devaluation-output relationship. This has allowed us to reduce the possible criticisms associated with small samples or selection bias. In contrast with existing studies, we recognise that the persistence of devaluations may matter and that devaluations may affect not just output growth but also its trend, an aspect that has been overlooked in the existing literature.
Using different -and complementary-methodologies, we find that devaluations tend to be associated with substantially weaker output growth in the short run. Nonetheless, we find that this decline often reverts at longer horizons. When we consider explicitly the relevance of the persistence of the devaluations, we find that stand alone episodes lead to positive gains in output trend at a ten year horizon, while successive devaluations do not affect the trend level of output. This has a relevant policy implication, as it indicates that poorly executed devaluations (i.e. those that are associated with high domestic inflation and a credit crunch) can induce no long-run output gains.
The evidence confirms that small cross-section or time samples do lead to different results. More precisely, we find that: i) the impact of devaluations has shifted over time in a nonuniform manner; ii) the effects of these episodes differ across regions, possibly indicating that relevant transmission channels have different relative importance. Finally, and related to the previous points, iii) it illustrates that studying the relationship between devaluations and output is likely to be sensitive to the use of small samples, which can bias the results. In general these elements are indicative of the complexity surrounding the devaluation-output relationship. Furthermore, that it is relevant to consider idiosyncratic elements explicitly.
Finally, our study opens important research questions, in particular those that are necessary to explain the sensitivity of the results over time and across regions. For instance, some questions that in our opinion deserve more attention are: what is the relative importance of the different transmission channels involved in the devaluation-output relationship? How has this relationship shifted over time? Is it that the size of shocks has changed? Or is it that the transmission channels have evolved? Why would some mechanisms operate in some regions and not in others? Finally, are there any policies that combined with persistent devaluations lead to output gains in the long run? We leave an answer to them for future research.
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Table 3
Annual growth performance and large currency devaluations Large currency devaluation as captured by definition 3. See definitions in section 3.
Table 4
Likelihood of growth acceleration after a large devaluation ( Note: Authors' calculations.
Table 5
Growth acceleration after a one-time devaluation ( Note: Authors' calculations.
Table 6
Growth acceleration after a one-time devaluation ( Note: Authors' calculations. Impulse responses to large devaluations Definition 3 by Regions
